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Abstract
This article intends to describe the scope of the right to work in the World Bank's 2013 World Development
Report: Jobs. In the first place, the article analyses, from a legal prospective, the right to work as phrased in the
main international human rights instruments. Academic comments and judicial developments are included in
the analysis, as well as international organisms' contributions. Second, the article compares this interpretation
to the World Bank's ideas on the issue, as expressed in the report. Through this comparison, the Bank's
contradictions and restrictive constructions become apparent. Finally, the article describes the risks faced by
borrower countries if their policies are designed according to the World Bank proposals.
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Introduction 
 
The World Bank (WB) is a key global player in development policymaking. 
Developing countries usually turn to this institution looking for financial support 
and policy guidance. The WB has remarkable intellectual and financial resources. 
It can design policies and it can also finance its implementation. It is an unsettled 
question whether such policies are appropriate ways to achieve development. A 
different, much less discussed question can be phrased as follows: Are the WB 
proposals consistent with human rights? Do human rights treaties have any 
relevance in development policymaking? Does the WB take human rights into 
account in the process of policy design? If not, what does this imply for borrower 
countries? 
 
Here I address these questions in a specific case. I focus on the WB's flagship 
publication, the World Development Report (hereinafter, WDR or Report). I 
analyse the WB's vision on workers' human rights, as articulated in the 2013 
edition of the WDR, entitled Jobs. In this work, the institution describes which 
jobs are good for development and which policies foster them. Although the 
Report seems to embrace a human rights approach, I will show in the following 
pages that several policy recommendations included in the text contradict specific 
human rights included in covenants ratified by most States in the world. 
Therefore, borrower countries will probably face a political and legal dilemma in 
trying to follow economic policy advice from the WB while honoring their human 
rights obligations.  
 
In this article, I begin by discussing how the Report embraces inconsistent notions 
of human rights. The first section outlines workers' human rights as part of 
international human rights law. Then, I analyse the WB's position on the binding 
nature of human rights instruments. In the third part, I describe the relationship 
between human rights and job policies set out in the 2013 World Development 
Report. Finally, I focus on the risks borrower countries face if they accept WB 
proposals without a thorough rights-based revision. 
 
 
1. Workers' human rights 
 
Traditionally, human rights are associated with civil and political rights, such as 
freedom from torture, the right to vote, religious freedom, the right to marry, 
freedom of speech, or the right to have an attorney in criminal trials. The 1948 
UDHR, for instance, grants this group of rights, in articles 3 to 21. Similar rights 
have an expanded version in the 1966 ICCPR, sponsored by the UN.  
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 Human rights also include economic, social and cultural rights. Most of them can 
be found in articles 22 to 27 of the UDHR, and the 1966 ICESCR is completely 
devoted to this kind of human rights. As of September 2014, the ICESCR has 
been ratified by 162 countries.1 Some of them relate to protection against 
misfortune (such as the right to health, for instance), while some others enable 
people to develop their own life plans (the right to take part in cultural life offers 
an interesting example). In addition to that, some economic, social and cultural 
rights are clearly linked to labor relationships: these are workers' human rights.  
 
The right to work bears extraordinary importance. According to article 6 of the 
ICESCR, everyone has the right to “the opportunity to gain his living by work he 
freely chooses or accepts”. All States who are parties to the Covenant “will take 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right”, including “policies [...] to achieve 
steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive 
employment”, with due respect to “fundamental political and economic 
freedoms”. Harvey defines this right as “an individual entitlement to a freely 
chosen job paying wages capable of supporting a dignified existence”. It is not a 
right to keep a certain job (Harvey, 2002, pp. 371-373, 381). It was first 
recognised as a positive right in article 21 of the 1793 French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen.2 Full employment is an objective of the UN and its 
members, according to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, which is a binding 
international treaty. Harvey emphasises that full employment is a situation where 
“adequately paid work is available to all job-seekers”. Yet many economists 
define it as the lowest unemployment level compatible with low inflation rates, 
the “non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment”. Therefore, the real goal 
for these economists is to keep inflation in check (Harvey, 2002, pp. 373, 405, 
468), an objective that cannot override a State's legal obligations based on 
international human rights treaties. 
 
As the Covenant's monitoring organ, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
                                         
1  Seven countries have signed but not yet ratified the Covenant: Belice, Comoros, Cuba, 
Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa and the United States of America. Updated 
information available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en 
2  “La société doit la subsistance aux citoyens malheureux, soit en leur procurant du 
travail, soit en assurant les moyens d'exister à ceux qui sont hors d'état de travailler” (“Society 
owes maintenance to unfortunate citizens, either procuring work for them or in ensuring the means 
of existence for those who are unable to work”). The complete French text, available at: 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-
constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-24-juin-1793.5084.html  
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Cultural Rights (here in after, the Committee) has explained the content and scope 
of the right to work. According to the Committee's General Comment No. 18 
(issued in 2005), this is an individual right. It is not an “absolute and 
unconditional right to obtain employment”, but it imposes several obligations on 
the States parties, including the obligation to take all necessary measures to 
achieve full employment, “as expeditiously and effectively as possible” (parags. 
6, 19 and 20). Again, full employment is described as part of the right to work. 
The progressive realisation of this right implies that, in principle, no retrogressive 
measures should be taken (parag. 21). The Committee also underscores that in 
negotiations with international financial institutions, such as the WB, all States 
parties should “ensure protection of the right to work of their population”. In turn, 
countries who have a bearing in decision-making procedures at those institutions 
should promote policies and programmes that support the effective enforcement 
of the right to work in borrower States (parag. 30). Abouharb and Cingranelli 
(2007) offer a review of several studies on the effects of structural adjustment; 
they also perform their own empirically based study to show that structural 
adjustment programs affect the right to work, among other human rights. For 
instance, privatisation processes lead to massive layoffs and cuts in subsidies; 
trade liberalisation harms local industries while labor flexibilisation weakens 
workers' rights.  
 
Article 6 of the Covenant, according to the Committee, must be read together with 
articles 7 and 8, which define conditions and features of “decent” work.3 Such a 
job, for instance, must be done under safe and healthy working conditions, and it 
must ensure a remuneration enough to provide decent living, as defined by the 
Covenant, for the worker and his or her family. This includes all the rights 
enshrined in the ICESCR, from food to healthcare to housing and education, all of 
them included in art. 11. The Covenant also grants equal pay for equal work and 
the right to form a union, to join a union or to refuse to do so. Periodic holidays 
with pay and a reasonable limitation of working hours are also part of the “decent 
work” concept, since they are included in article 7 of the Covenant.  In addition to 
that, ensuring the right to work provides also a means to foster other economic 
and social rights, because labor provides goods and services, increasing societal 
resources and national wealth (Harvey, 2002, pp. 466-467). As to the applicable 
measures, the usual Keynesian strategy is to foster labor demand in the private 
sector, as the Roosevelt administration did in the 1940s. According to Harvey, 
right to work advocates should take also into account a different strategy, 
discussed in the beginning of the New Deal: direct government job creation 
(Committee on Economic Security, 1935). Harvey (2007, pp. 122, 139) explains 
                                         
3  General Comment No. 18 (2005), parag. 8. 
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that government job creation is an adequate instrument to deal with job shortages; 
he adds it is “the only mechanism that provides a potentially justiciable means of 
securing the right”. The main obstacles to achieving full employment are job 
shortages, not structural barriers such as gender- or age-discrimination. 
 
I now turn to the WB and its vision on human rights and on workers' rights, in 
order to get a deeper understanding of the 2013 edition of its World Development 
Report. 
 
 
2. The World Bank and human rights. 
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or “World Bank” 
was founded in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where Allied nations 
designed the international financial order to be developed in the postwar period. 
As an international financial institution, the Bank raises most of its funds on 
global markets by selling bonds (World Bank, 2007, pp. 13, 44, 60). Its influence 
becomes apparent in the amount of resources it lends: between 15 and 25 billion 
dollars each year, while the UNDP expends less than 3 billion (Killinger, 2003, p. 
74). 
 
After 1980, international financial institutions, including the WB, design their 
recommendations along the lines of the so-called “Washington Consensus” 
(Ghazi, 2005, p. 46), an array of neoliberal tenets that foster “a shift in power 
from the state to the market” (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007, p. 3). Strict budget 
discipline, privatisations, trade and financial sector deregulation and cuts in social 
spending make the core of “structural adjustment”, the key policy to be 
implemented as a condition to receive loans. This is known as the “conditionality” 
system, or “policy-based lending”.  Stabilisation, adjustment and liberalisation 
coexist with an explicit concern with poverty. The 1990 World Development 
Report proposes a two-part strategy: labor-intensive growth and a widespread 
provision of basic social services, including health, education and safety nets. 
Social lending increases, but the “market liberalisation” mindset keeps a dominant 
position (Kanbur and Vines, 2000, pp. 101-103). Poverty is not seen as a human 
rights issue, but just as an economic problem with social implications. The WB 
commits itself to find the appropriate technical solution, but it does not see human 
rights, and particularly socioeconomic rights, as a limit. Therefore, the institution 
explores and endorses different policy alternatives, but it does not check if those 
policies are consistent with human rights obligations assumed by borrower States. 
Political feasibility or fiscal sustainability are the defining criteria in designing 
policy recommendations; human rights are not. For instance, WB staff may offer 
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differential minimal wage levels for female workers as a way to improve their 
employability –as I describe below. Yet this proposal is openly in conflict with 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, and this may become relevant if the borrower country has ratified the 
Convention. In Section 3, I will analyse in more detail how the WB understands 
the relationship between human rights and policy options.   
 
The WB is described today as a “teaching institution”. It conducts large-scale 
research and dissemination activities, yet some critics underscore it does not take 
into account other institutions' relevant work on development issues. In spite of 
their diverse national origins, most economists at the WB have been trained in the 
same environment: graduate schools of American universities (Fine, 2002). WB 
publications, in general, are self-referential, with no adequate review of previous 
works or local research. Publications keep the WB remarkably alive not only in 
the general public sphere, but also in the international market of academic 
journals (Sindzingre, 2004).  
 
Yet some unsettling features also appear in the WB's institutional life. Internal 
reports have critically exposed “loan approval” culture, which may stimulate 
shallow evaluations (Fine, 2002, p. 208). Many WB projects lack effectiveness, as 
shown by Wapenhans (1992): over one-third of the projects had failed according 
to the institution's own criteria. Every failed project leaves a financial burden on 
the borrower country (Rich, 2009, pp. 27-28, 46). Sarfaty (2009, pp. 668-670), 
based on her research at the WB, sums up the institution's incentive system in a 
statement by one staff member: “The culture of the [World] Bank is getting a 
project to the Board […] That's what gives you standing”. This may lead to an 
excessive concern on the Executive Board's approval for a project, regardless of 
the subsequent concrete results. Promotions, as Sarfaty explains, are based on the 
size (in money lent) and number of projects approved by the Board. In this 
context, safeguard policies (to protect the environment or indigenous peoples' 
rights, for example) become time-consuming obstacles that reduce opportunities 
for promotion. Project teams find reasons to exclude safeguard policies as much 
as possible in their preparation process. Moreover, project managers are allowed 
to put these policies in line with other objectives. 
 
 
3. Human rights: the Bank's approach. 
 
The WB does not evaluate its projects according to human rights standards 
(Darrow, 2003, pp. 19, 51, 149). There is no formal consideration, for instance, of 
economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to work, the right to social 
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security or the right to holidays with pay. It is not surprising, then, that poverty or 
unemployment are not analysed as human rights problems.  
 
International human rights treaties, such as the 1948 UDHR or the 1966 ICESCR, 
only bind States; international organizations, such as the WB, cannot become 
parties to these instruments. In turn, Darrow (2003, p. 128) argues this does not 
mean human rights conventions are absolutely irrelevant for the IMF or the WB. 
As members of the UN system, both institutions are bound by the UN Charter and 
UN-sponsored human rights standards. Sarfaty (2009, pp. 658-659) argues that a 
clear consensus has not been reached among international law scholars on the 
WB's legal obligations under international human rights law. While the World 
Bank (2007, p. 40) defines itself as a specialised agency of the UN, under the 
Economic and Social Council's formal jurisdiction, the Council has not been able 
to exercise its supervisory function over the WB (Killinger, 2003, p. 70). 
 
The WB holds a different conception. According to its view, human rights are 
beyond its mission. The WB, self-described as a technical institution with a non-
political mandate, does not consider itself bound by international human rights 
instruments (Ghazi, 2005, pp. 82-83). The non-political mandate preserves the 
WB's apolitical and technical image, a necessary condition to raise its funds in 
capital markets. Killinger (2003, pp. 3, 158-159) argues the WB sees development 
as a technical and apolitical process.  
 
The WB has always favored a restrictive interpretation of its Articles of 
Agreement. These Articles do not prevent the WB from extending its mission to 
include civil and political rights. Yet according to Killinger, the Articles do not 
require the WB to do it, except for a few human rights standards known as ius 
cogens (Killinger, 2003, pp. 69, 116, 167-168). The “political” prohibition in the 
Articles of Agreement are consistent with the principle of non-intervention. But 
this respect for a country's policy choices cannot be construed as a permission to 
violate human rights (Klein, 1999). At the same time, the General Counsel's office 
at the WB has gradually expanded the mandate to include social and political 
dimensions of development, anticorruption programmes and judicial reform 
projects (Sarfaty, 2009, pp. 658-659).  
 
The WB has not released any Operational Policy on human rights, unlike other 
institutions such as UNESCO or UNICEF (Ghazi, 2005, p. 60). Human rights, 
according to Sarfaty (2009, pp. 647-648), is still a marginal issue at the WB. No 
policy aims to reduce the impact of any project on human rights. In engaging in 
policy dialogue with a member country, no requirement is made to consider the 
borrower's duties under international human rights law. In recent years, the WB 
6
Journal of Economic and Social Policy, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
http://epubs.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol16/iss2/2
makes indirect references and carry out activities linked to human rights, though 
there is no acceptance of legal obligations based on these rights (Ghazi, 2005, pp. 
82-83).   
 
In the case of economic, social and cultural rights, the WB argues that its poverty 
reduction efforts and its development assistance help to create the conditions for 
the enjoyment of those rights and for the provision of basic services in education, 
health and nutritition. This, according to the WB, will turn the ideals included in 
the 1948 Declaration into a living reality. A 1998 WB report (Development and 
Human Rights: the role of the World Bank) endorsed the indivisibility of human 
rights, but highlighted the need of development as a necessary condition for the 
effective enjoyment of those rights (Ghazi, 2005, p. 60). The World Bank (1993) 
delivered this line of arguments in its official contribution to the 1993 World 
Conference in Human Rights. Yet Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007, pp. 137, 230-
235) expose how structural adjustment programs sponsored by the IMF and the 
WB affect respect for human rights. Social and economic rights of the poor, in 
particular, suffer the hardest impact.  
 
In the past twenty years, different groups inside the WB have attempted to 
mainstream human rights issues and standards in the institution's procedures and 
concerns. Sarfaty (2009, pp. 647-648) describes a series of internal meetings and 
reports between 2002 and 2006 which show a mounting interest in the issue of 
human rights, and an internal advocacy was becoming visible. However, all of 
these initiatives were not successful. Sarfaty explains, based on her interviews 
with WB staff, that the institution continues to neglect human rights obligations of 
borrower countries when it designs or assesses policies. Therefore, constitutional 
questions or human rights issues may become apparent only when policies are 
implemented. For instance, when the WB suggests imposing student fees on 
primary schools (Darrow, 2003, p. 254), this may conflict with the borrower 
country's constitutional clause on free education, or with an international 
commitment (e. g., if the country is party to the ICESCR, which requires, as a 
general rule, free elementary education in art. 13).  
 
The current situation at the WB shows the prevalence of a particular conception of 
human rights: the one held by economists. According to it, human rights have 
largely an instrumental value. They are just another means to bring about 
development, economic growth or other objectives. Human rights 
implementation, as a consequence, must be pragmatic: it may even imply trade-
offs when resources are scarce. States may make choices between one right or 
another, and people must endure this sort of illegitimate exchange. This differs 
from the vision held by many lawyers (even inside the WB), who give human 
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rights an intrinsic value. Under this approach, human rights must be enforced and 
protected because of their own value (Sarfaty, 2009, pp. 677-678). 
 
The instrumental vision on human rights includes, of course, the set of workers' 
human rights. In the next section, I analyse how the WB tries to introduce human 
rights language in its most important publication, while keeping these rights in the 
narrowest interpretation possible. This goes along the WB's traditional approach 
to human rights, described by Killinger as “highly inconsistent”, since it does not 
use accepted human rights standards nor accounts for the full scope of the rights 
involved (Killinger, 2003, p. 126). 
 
 
4. Workers' human rights: The World Bank vision 
 
Among its many publications, the World Development Report (WDR) has a 
prominent place. Every year, the Report clearly exposes the WB's current 
concerns and ideas in a particular area or issue. It expresses how concepts evolve 
in the WB and it also fosters that evolution (Sindzingre, 2004, p. 166). While it is 
not the only element used to design specific policies, the WDR offers a thorough 
explanation on the reasons to adopt certain policies in a certain field.  
 
The WDR 20134 is entitled Jobs, and it deals with the relationship between 
employment and development. It stresses that “development happens through 
jobs”, because “working is the most effective way out of poverty”. 
 
This edition has been received with generally positive remarks. It has been praised 
for its extensive review of the existing literature. The International Labor 
Organisation (ILO), in its official comment on the publication, describes this as a 
“major achievement”. Moreover, the ILO appreciates the “close consultation” that 
the WDR team carried out with the ILO experts, and it states that the Organisation 
finds “much common ground with the report” (ILO, 2012).  
 
At first sight, the Report offers a nuanced perspective. Some policies which are 
not part of the traditional “Washington Consensus” are seriously discussed. Many 
problems are only described, and no particular solution is favored. In many cases, 
the WB makes clear that there is no perfect, singular solution for certain 
problems. For instance, the report admits that budget deficits “are more or less 
worrisome depending on how quickly an economy is growing”, or that “the 
                                         
4  For a complete reference, see World Bank (2012) in the Reference List at the end of this 
article. 
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independence of central banks needs to be weighed against the overall coherence 
of the country's development strategy”(WDR 2013, pp. 23, 294). Both statements 
seem compatible with a more open attitude toward non-orthodox economic 
thought. In commenting the 2008 financial crisis, the WB also concedes that 
“heated debates on the appropriate regulation of the financial sector” have been 
reopened (WDR 2013, p. 294). The ILO (2012) praises the report for departing 
from the “one size fits all” approach, and for not promoting the usual neoliberal 
position on labor market flexibility. In fact, the report acknowledges that “there is 
no consensus on what the content of labor policies should be”, because “views are 
polarised” (WDR 2013, pp. 26, 260). 
 
Moreover, the report also makes clear references to human rights. This appears to 
be an important breakthrough, in light of the WB's traditional stance on human 
rights. Yet these mentions lose all their potential as the document goes on, since 
the notion of human rights becomes increasingly restricted.  
 
The report proposes in its initial pages a broad, appealing normative definition of 
“jobs”: “activities that generate income, monetary or in kind, without violating 
human rights” (WDR 2013, p. 5; emphasis added). Any activity that affects human 
rights cannot be considered a job. “Basic human rights”, the report explains, are 
the “boundaries of what is unacceptable”. The same paragraph states that 
international human rights norms include the 1948 UDHR and the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work5. The UDHR, as I 
explained before, includes various socioeconomic rights, with specific references 
to workers' rights. The ILO Declaration grants only four basic labor principles: 
“(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the 
effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation” (art. 2). 
 
This human rights-based definition entails several interesting consequences. For 
instance, there is no “job” when wages are not fair, or when working conditions 
are not safe and healthy, or when there are no periodic holidays with pay, since all 
of these rights are part of the UDHR (arts. 23 and 24). [...] 
 
A few pages later, the publication starts to delineate a narrower approach. In a 
new definition, the WDR 2013 (p. 49) states that “activities […] involving 
violations of fundamental human rights should not be considered jobs” (emphasis 
                                         
5  Available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--
en/index.htm 
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added). There is no clear indication of which rights are deemed “fundamental”. 
Maybe some of the UDHR rights do not belong to this category. If this were the 
case, periodic holidays with pay, for instance, could be considered a “non-
fundamental” right. A job that does not guarantee it could still be called a job.  
 
Later on, the report redefines the concept of “basic human rights”, adopted in the 
initial pages. This new version encompasses the four “core labor standards” 
established by the 1998 ILO Declaration. It does not include all rights enshrined 
in the UDHR, but only two: “the right to work” and “protection from 
discrimination” (WDR 2013, p. 65). Fair wages, periodic holidays with pay, safe 
and healthy working conditions, among other clauses, are lost in the new 
definition. 
 
Now the WB is ready for the final reformulation. By the end of Chapter 1, a new 
definition of “jobs” can be found: “activities that generate actual income, 
monetary or in kind, and do not violate fundamental rights and principles at 
work” (WDR 2013, p. 66; emphasis added). This is a clear reference to the 1998 
ILO Declaration's title. In just sixty pages, the WB goes from a broad, inclusive 
reference to “human rights” as the normative basis for acceptable jobs, to the four 
“core labor standards” included in the 1998 Declaration. This is a remarkable 
change: in a few steps the WB moves the boundary between “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” jobs, reducing the scope of applicable rights and shifting many 
“unacceptable” jobs into the “acceptable” realm. 
 
In the rest of the report, only the 1998 ILO Declaration becomes a clear rule, the 
“global agenda of labor rights” (WDR 2013, p. 156), the core labor standards 
which “provide a floor” and “provide guidance on what is unacceptable” on the 
four distinct areas covered by the document (child labor, discrimination, forced 
labor and freedom of association and collective bargaining) (WDR 2013, pp. 25, 
155, 297). According to Alston and Heenan (2004, pp. 230-232, 241-242), this 
four-core-standard system developed in the trade sphere, not in the labor 
movement; and it leads to a “watering down or even an undermining of the notion 
of international labor standards”. First, because this approach gives space to 
diverse and perhaps inconsistent definitions of these standards, drafted by 
different actors (public and private), which can choose among them according to 
their convenience.  Second, because it concentrates on procedural labor standards, 
related to civil and political liberties. Economic and social rights lose relevance, 
affecting the indivisibility principle even beyond the labor realm. In addition to 
that, the singling out of certain standards as “core” explicitly differs from the 
traditional ILO system, where no standard had prominence. Third, because the 
Declaration favors promotion, dialogue and technical assistance over actual legal 
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enforcement. 
 
In contrast, the WB report includes more than one explicit mention to property 
rights, with no restrictions. “Clear property rights”, including secure intellectual 
property rights, are advised, since “the link between respect for property and 
development is well established” (WDR 2013, pp. 292, 297). A similar phrasing 
appears in the 2005 edition of the Report, which stresses the importance of 
enforcing property rights (in particular, rights to land) and contracts, curbing 
crime and stopping uncompensated expropriations (World Bank, 2004, pp. 9, 79-
80). An additional weakening feature is added to labor rights: while the rule of 
law “ensures the enforcement of contracts”, it includes only the “progressive 
realisation” of workers’ rights (WDR 2013, pp. 22, 292). In other words, not all 
labor rights must be respected at once. Some violations may be admitted in initial 
stages, until “progress” is made. 
 
The right to work, granted in art. 23 of the 1948 UDHR, is mentioned in some 
passages (e.g., WDR 2013, p. 156). Yet there is no explanation of its content or 
consequences. No reference is made to the UN Committee’s General Comment 
18, which fleshes out the meaning and scope of the right to work. No policy 
options are discussed to promote or fulfill this right. There is no discussion of 
scholarly arguments about this right, such as the ones I described before. 
 
Labor informality is not analysed as a human rights issue. Informal workers have 
no labor rights, such as those included in article 23 of the UDHR. Probably, they 
are also excluded from social security, which is granted in art. 22. The Report 
only considers the link between informality and low productivity. The economic 
analysis leaves no place for a rights-based review of unregistered labor. The 
concept of social security is also somewhat restricted. To remain eligible for 
unemployment benefits, for instance, the Report states that “a forthcoming 
attitude by jobseekers” is required (WDR 2013, p. 270). Access to a human right 
(though not described as such) appears to be conditioned to a certain 
psychological status. This approach seems hard to reconcile with the notion of 
universal human rights. 
 
Even the notion of “progressive realisation” of workers' rights6, included by the 
                                         
6  The “progressivity principle” is a well-known standard in the realm of economic, social 
and cultural rights. It comes from art. 2 of the ICESCR: States commit themselves to achieve 
every step possible in order to reach the most extensive enjoyment of these rights. In its General 
Comment 3, issued in 1990, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains 
that “progressive realization” means that States have to move “as expeditiously as possible” 
towards the full enjoyment of every right included in the ICESCR. See, e.g., Kalantry et al., 2010, 
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WB in the report, is not taken seriously. The Report includes regressive measures 
among acceptable policy alternatives. Poland's pension reform is shown as an 
“example” of success in achieving sustainability. In that country, the WB explains, 
“old-age pension benefits adjust downward as life expectancy increases”, making 
them “significantly lower than the average in the European Union”. This 
“downward” adjustment is an explicit regression. According to the report, in 2012 
retirement age was raised in 2 years for men and 7 years for women (WDR 2013, 
pp. 31, 302), marking a new regressive turn: people now have to work more years 
than they had to under previous regulations.  
 
Health, nutrition or education are not defined as human rights, but as 
“development goals”. The Report stresses that they are important as part of 
“human capital formation”, because they “equip people for productive 
employment”; these goals “necessitate attention” from governments (WDR 2013, 
pp. 24-25, 296-297). The notion of human rights-based State obligations is absent 
when it comes to food, education or healthcare. Property rights, on the other hand, 
are part of the rule of law.  
 
Protection against unemployment is a human right, enshrined in article 23 of the 
1948 UDHR. Article 6 of the ICESCR, in turn, grants the right to work: 
unemployment relief measures are implicit. The Report's description of 
employment protection legislation does not include a rights-based analysis. The 
text only highlights that the overall impact of this legislation is quite modest. In 
particular, the WB stresses that “efficiency effects” are “relatively modest”. 
Countries can choose a particular protection against unemployment, “depending 
on their normative preferences” (WDR 2013, pp. 260-262). Once again, the report 
tries to transform a human rights issue into a problem of policy choices. 
International obligations based on the UDHR and the ICESCR are wrongly 
reformulated as options which remain open to States. 
 
Minimum wage is not considered as a right (WDR 2013, p. 270), or as an element 
of the right to work, or as a genuine limit to the State and employers in their 
contracting practices. On the contrary, it appears to be another economic 
instrument, just another tool that can be used for multiple purposes, not only (or 
not necessarily) to ensure workers' basic needs. For instance, the WB understands 
it can be used in combination with wage levels at public works programs, usually 
adopted as part of a social safety net. As the WB explains, “careful setting of the 
wage level can be a self-targeting tool” for potential beneficiaries (WDR 2013, p. 
261). In other words, if public works programs' pay ranks below an already low 
                                                                                                                
pp. 267-268. 
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official minimum wage, only those in the greatest need would sign up for the 
programs. “Efficient” targeting would be achieved through minimum wage 
setting. This idea appears in previous WDR editions; one of them includes other 
proposals, such as creating “lower subminima for some groups (young workers) 
or for subnational labor markets” (World Bank, 2004, p. 2), and it offers this 
example: “erosion of the minimum wage in Mexico in the 1990s is credited with 
boosting female employment”. Affecting a human right may be seen as a positive 
measure. To improve the investment climate, the WB advises to implement 
different levels of minimum wage. This, in turn, implies different meanings of 
worker's dignity, according to article 7 of the ICESCR. When gender is one of the 
defining criteria for specific subminima, deeper human rights issues come to the 
surface. That previous edition also explains that when minimum wage is too high, 
it hurts the chances of low-skilled workers, because that wage is “much higher 
than their productivity potential” (World Bank, 2004, pp. 142, 144). According to 
WDR 2013 (pp. 262-263), minimum wage levels are to be calculated according to 
its impact on efficiency levels, or to be assessed in terms of employers' interests, 
without considering the human rights dimension. Wage levels in general should be 
decided in “competitive conditions”, which implies that wages are just another 
price, and not a human right.  
 
A similar approach appears with regard to protection for people with disabilities. 
It is included as a right in art. 25 of the 1948 UDHR, but the report has a different 
vision: disability benefits “can provide important income protection, but costs 
have mounted […], and the benefits can create work disincentives among the 
general population” (WDR 2013, p. 273). The WB believes disability benefits may 
erode able-bodied workers' willingness to find a job. 
 
Generally speaking, economic, social and cultural rights included in the 1948 
Declaration are not mentioned or analysed. The broad reference to “human rights” 
in the first pages does not infuse the rest of the report, since the only binding 
standards come from the ILO’s 1998 Declaration. 
 
Migrant workers' rights are also given a superficial consideration. After outlining 
some of the problems associated with migration, the report describes the “diverse” 
views on what needs to be done: some favor the free movement of labor; another 
vision demands barriers and migration control; finally, other groups underscore 
“the moral imperative of protecting the human rights of migrants, no matter their 
legal status”. According to the Report, “none of these views suffices”, because 
they fail to “address the complex tradeoffs that migration poses for policy design” 
(WDR 2013, pp. 34, 310). This passage offers two main worrisome elements. 
First, it describes human rights protection as a “moral imperative”, leaving aside 
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the binding nature of applicable international legal instruments, such as the 1990 
UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families7. Second, the report includes migrant workers' human 
rights on a bargaining table, where compromises are reached.  
 
In analysing all labor policies, the WB adopts a pragmatic, case-by-case approach, 
where rights are not part of the defining criteria. According to this view, labor 
regulations should “at least partially address labor market imperfections without 
reducing efficiency” (WDR 2013, p. 27). A genuine rights-based regulation would 
not reformulate rights in light of efficiency, since the latter is not a right in itself. 
Human rights have to be harmonised between them. For instance, property rights 
must coexist with workers’ rights; the right to work should not affect freedom of 
contract. Yet “efficiency”, as such, is not a human right, and human rights are not 
to be “balanced” with it. Quite to the contrary, efficiency is to be achieved without 
affecting human rights –just like crime reduction is to be achieved without 
affecting defendants’ rights or guarantees. The WB holds a very different 
approach: labor rights are to be respected to the extent that “efficiency” is not 
affected. 
 
Rights (in this case, workers’ rights) are subject to a cost-benefit analysis, in a 
pragmatic approach. The report highlights that “calculations are different when 
the overall development impact is the guiding objective” (WDR 2013, p. 29). In 
other words, this time the WB tries to have a more comprehensive view, but the 
analytical framework remains the same: costs and benefits. According to its 
previous publications, the WB “generally supports measures that seek to improve 
or protect human capital, such as labor market interventions, publicly mandated 
unemployment or old-age insurance, and targeted income support”. These 
measures, according to the WB, “contribute to a country's solidarity, social 
cohesion and social stability” (World Bank, 2007, p. 170). Again, all these 
measures are justified by their positive impact, not by their relationship to human 
rights such as the right to social security. This pragmatic view gives rights an 
instrumental, not intrinsic, value8. Under this approach, efficiency is the only 
relevant criteria in defining labor and social policies.  This matches the 
institutionally accepted meaning of economic, social and cultural rights. As 
explained before, this is the dominant view at the WB: the economic vision of 
human rights. 
                                         
7  The Convention is in force since 2003. As of September 2014, it has 47 member parties. 
See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en 
8  The Bank explains, for instance, that “India has learned how to live with cumbersome 
regulatory obstacles” in the labor market through “widespread noncompliance”. In other words, 
labor rights can be set aside in order to achieve efficiency; see World Bank, 2012: 313.  
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The case of child labor 
 
Even some elements of the 1998 Declaration appear under a restrictive approach. 
While the ILO Declaration requires the effective abolition of child labor, the WB 
report only rejects the worst forms of it. In a box entitled “Not all child work is 
child labor” (WDR 2013, p. 66), the report argues that ILO standards and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on this issue should not be taken too 
strictly: “international standards also provide countries with some latitude in 
setting allowed boundaries for involvement of children in productive activities 
(regarding ages or the definition of hazardous work, for example)”. The WB adds 
that “children work for diverse and complex reasons”; while “child labor may 
affect schooling, health, fertility and behaviour”, it is difficult to establish the 
links to these effects. Then it goes on to say that “the participation of children 12 
years and older in family farming and small household enterprises can in some 
cases contribute to the acquisition of skills”. It is easy to see that the WB is going 
beyond the 1998 ILO Declaration. While article 2 of this document calls for the 
effective abolition of all forms of child labor9, the WB only rejects “child 
prostitution” and “harmful forms of child labor” (WDR 2013, pp. 14-15, 155-156). 
This implies that some child labor may be deemed acceptable. In General 
Comment 18, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
establishes that States must adopt measures to prohibit labor by children under the 
age of 16 (parag. 24). 
 
 
5. Risks for borrower countries 
 
The WB's narrow conception of workers' human rights may influence borrower 
countries' vision through the negotiation process. If policies are informed by 
restrictive approaches, member nations may find themselves in contradiction with 
binding human rights treaties. WB-sponsored regressive measures and 
instrumental approaches to human rights may prove inconsistent with 
international obligations based on human rights law.  
 
For instance, a loan to implement a pension reform may include a rise in 
retirement age, or a reduction of pension benefits, as it happened in the case of 
Poland, discussed before. In such a case, these regressive measures appear to be 
inconsistent with the progressivity principle. Another example can be found in 
conditional cash transfer programs. In these programs, access to welfare payments 
is subject to specific actions by the receivers. An official WB publication 
                                         
9  The Bank itself acknowledges this is the ILO position (WDR 2013, p. 156).   
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describes these conditions as “prespecified investments in the human capital [of 
children]” (Fiszbein et al., 2009, p. 1). At the same time, these programs have 
been commended for being compatible with free market principles10. The WB has 
promoted conditional cash transfers as a tool to reduce poverty, and it has granted 
loans to finance them in various countries. In some cases, cash benefits may be 
subject to conditions that contradict the human right to equal treatment and 
nondiscrimination, granted in art. 2 of the UDHR and art. 2 of the ICESCR. 
Argentina's Universal Child Allowance program, partially funded by the WB 
through loan 7703-AR11, requires unregistered and unemployed workers to 
provide proof of their children's health checks and school attendance. This is not 
required to registered workers who are entitled to a family allowance under a 
preexisting system. No explicit justification, from a human rights prospectiv, has 
been offered for this differential. In any of these examples, if the borrower country 
is a State party to the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol12, affected people may 
file individual complaints13 before the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, based on the progressivity principle, or on the right to equal 
treatment. 
 
Through the negotiation process, the WB's instrumental vision on human rights 
becomes part of accepted policies. There is a long “policy dialogue” between the 
WB and the borrower country in several phases (Ghazi, 2005, pp. 250-251; World 
Bank, 2007, pp. 78-80). All of them are expressed in diverse documents: policy 
framework paper, country strategy paper, etc., which outline a macro-economic 
strategy and its sectoral version. In the first stage (identification), feasible projects 
to sustain these strategies are singled out. In the second (pre-appraisal), the 
borrower country (usually with assistance from the WB) prepares a detailed report 
on the project's feasibility. After these two stages, the WB carries out its own 
assessment from four standpoints: technical soundness, institutional capacities at 
the borrower country, economical relevance for development, and financial ability 
to obtain further funding. When the WB's appraisal is complete, the formal 
documents for the loan are drafted through a series of discussions with the 
borrower country. The project is then submitted to the Board of Executive 
Directors. After its approval, the parties sign the loan agreement. The borrower 
                                         
10  This opinion is analyzed in Valencia Lomelí, 2008: 479. 
11  Official text of the loan agreement, available at: http://go.worldbank.org/VTF6V1O8W0 
12  The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR entered into force on May 5, 2013. As of 
September 2014, it has 15 State parties:  Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cabo Verde, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Mongolia, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain and Uruguay; see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en  
13  Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, art. 2.  
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country starts then to put the project into practice. Evaluation is the last phase: 
after a project finishes, the WB's Independent Evaluation Group examines the 
results against the original purposes. The report is not public. 
 
The “dialogic” process, of course, has a strong limitation: the final document has 
to be acceptable for the Board, where largest shareholders have a decisive weight. 
It seems difficult to move too far from the dominant institutional vision, namely, 
an instrumental, economy-centered conception of human rights. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the 2013 edition of its flagship publication, the WB articulates its view. The 
right to work and workers' rights are again diluted, subject to efficiency concerns 
and economic objectives. A foggy reformulation of human rights in the labor 
sphere puts borrower countries in risk of adopting policies which are inconsistent 
with legally binding international human rights obligations. In order to obtain a 
loan from the WB, a borrower country may weaken or curtail socioeconomic 
rights. A few examples can be summed up here. A rise in retirement age could be 
used to balance the national budget. A more tolerant policy on child labor could be 
a recommended way to attract investors and to increase poor families' income. 
Unemployment benefits could be reduced in order to encourage people to seek a 
new job, which in turn will reduce unemployment. Less protection of migrant 
workers would encourage them to return to their homes abroad, making some jobs 
available for native workers. A set of different minimum wage levels may be used 
as an incentive to hire women or young, unexperienced workers. Low wages in 
public works programs would be useful to keep a balanced budget and to ensure 
only people in the most desperate condition sign up for these programs. Each of 
these measures violates at least one human right. This, in turn, may trigger judicial 
challenges, which are available in many countries, to strike these policies down, 
usually through constitutional review. In addition to that, under the ICESCR 
Optional Protocol, formal individual complaints may be filed against borrower 
countries.  
 
The absence of a strong human rights approach in the WB's policy design process 
yields these results. Until internal advocacy and international pressure lead to a 
change in this situation, borrower countries bear an important responsibility to 
ensure WB-sponsored policies are consistent with human rights standards and 
constitutional commitments. Civil society and social and political movements, 
both local and global, must also contribute to perform a thorough revision of 
World Bank proposals in light of civil, political, social, economic and cultural 
human rights. It is, once again, a crucial, unavoidable undertaking. 
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